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Mark Boulton. Failing Our Veterans: The G.I. Bill and the Vietnam
Generation. New York: New York University Press, 2014. Pp. 273.
On 26 November 1974, u .s . President Gerald Ford informed the House
of Representatives of his decision to veto the proposed expansion of
bill number 12628, known informally as the new Cold War g .i . Bill.
Citing the need to exercise “budgetary constraint… if we are to bring
inflation under control,” Ford was the first American president to
veto federal education funds for soldiers returning from active duty.
So unpopular was Ford’s decision, Congress overrode the president
a week later in a landmark vote in favour of improving Korean
War-era and Vietnam veterans’ education benefits.1 In Failing Our
Veterans: The G.I. Bill and the Vietnam Generation, Mark Boulton
traces the turbulent history of veterans’ legislation in the United
States from the early days of the Revolutionary War to the betrayal
felt by many Vietnam veterans following their return home from
Southeast Asia. Ultimately, Boulton has crafted a thoughtful and
well-researched account that explores the relationship between civic
duty and military service; specifically, what it means to fight for
Uncle Sam and then reacclimate to civilian life.
In Chapter 1, the author identifies several factors that have
traditionally informed the debate over veterans’ benefits. Money—
not surprisingly—was always the first consideration for policymakers.
What departments or social services will suffer as a result of extending
a helping hand to one segment of the population? The fear of draining
government coffers has kept several presidents from championing the
cause of veterans’ readjustment. Similar to Ford, Lyndon B. Johnson
(lbj) is an example of a Commander-in-Chief who prioritised fiscal
conservatism and domestic politics over returning soldiers’ needs.
Keen to promote the merits of his Great Society, lbj was reluctant to
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earmark federal funds for Vietnam vets that could be used to combat
poverty and racial injustice on the home front (pp. 15, 70-71).2
Equally important to the u.s . government were the dangers
associated with incentivising the business of soldiering. In other words,
what happens when a society rewards soldiers for simply performing
their duty? Given this thin line between citizenship and military
service, were some patriots more deserving than others? In 1776, as
an inducement to join ranks against the British, the Thirteen Colonies
ensured that wounded soldiers received half-pay for life. Then, four
years later following a string of military victories, the Continental
Congress granted all soldiers a one-time payment for service, while
permitting widows and orphans of Revolutionary soldiers fifty per
cent of their loved ones’ pay for the next seven years. However, this
practice did not sit well with the third President of the United States,
Thomas Jefferson, who warned against the “potentially corrosive
effect” of paying out men-at-arms (p. 21).
Another consideration was the power of veterans’ organisations
to lobby effectively on behalf of soldiers. This proved especially true
in the wake of Franklin Delano Roosevelt signing the 1944 g .i . Bill,
which eased Second World War veterans’ readjustment by providing
low-interest mortgage and business loans, as well as living expenses
and tuition payments (pp. 32-34). This last incentive remained a
thorn in the side of Vietnam-era veterans. In comparison to the
generous benefits bestowed on the “Greatest Generation,” the 1966
Cold War g .i . Bill fell short of the mark when it came to postsecondary education. Indeed, veterans found that the one hundred
dollars they were given each month covered only a small portion of
the funds needed to attend private colleges or top state universities.
To avoid mounting debt, many veterans opted to study at cheaper,
less prestigious schools, worked full-time in addition to studying, or
dropped out altogether. This was the dilemma faced by Oklahoma
native Dennis Rainwater, who served a tour of duty in Vietnam as a
first lieutenant and returned home wanting to continue his education.
Writing to President Richard Nixon in 1969, Rainwater let it be

2  
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known that he did not have any ill will toward the government or
even his fellow Americans who protested the war on college campuses.
However, he could not help but feel that coupled with such little
fanfare, “[and] at a time when you are trying to get support for your
Vietnam policy,” more ought to be done to ease the transition back
into civilian life (pp. 96, 100).
Building on the narrative advanced by Murray Polner in No
Victory Parades: The Return of the Vietnam Veteran (1970) and,
most recently, Patrick Hagopian’s wonderful book, The Vietnam
War in American Memory (2009), Failing Our Veterans makes
excellent use of private papers, presidential archives, and veterans’
interviews to highlight the long and fractious history of veterans’
rights in the United States. Nowhere is this more apparent than in
Boulton’s discussion of larger-than-life Texas congressman Olin E.
Teague. Known by the nickname “Tiger” to both his friends and
rivals, Teague was a decorated veteran of the Second World War and
served for seventeen years as chairman of the House Committee on
Veterans Affairs. Cut from the same Southern Democrat cloth as lbj,
throughout his tenure on the Veterans Affairs Committee, Teague
often had more in common with Nixon and the Republicans when
it came to doling out veterans’ benefits. Time and again, “Tiger”
jumped at the chance to filibuster bills that would provide Cold Warera veterans with similar benefits along the lines of the 1944 g .i . Bill.
At times, Boulton’s emphasis on Teague’s career—in particular
his rivalry with Texas senator Ralph Yarborough—overwhelms the
book’s through-line. It is also surprising that there is no mention
of George W. Bush’s 2008 post-9/11 g .i . Bill, if only to show how
veterans’ benefits have remained a topic of contention for u.s . legislators
in the intervening decades since the Vietnam War. Nevertheless,
Failing Our Veterans is highly recommended for scholars of modern
American history and anyone looking to gain a deeper understanding
of veterans’ affairs.
alyssa cundy , independent researcher
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